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RUGGEDNESS: THE BLESSING OF BAD GEOGRAPHY IN AFRICA
Nathan Nunn and Diego Puga*
Abstract—We show that geography, through its impact on history, can
have important effects on economic development today. The analysis
focuses on the historic interaction between ruggedness and Africa’s slave
trades. Although rugged terrain hinders trade and most productive activ-
ities, negatively affecting income globally, rugged terrain within Africa
afforded protection to those being raided during the slave trades. Since the
slave trades retarded subsequent economic development, ruggedness within
Africa has also had a historic indirect positive effect on income. Studying
all countries worldwide, we estimate the differential effect of ruggedness
on income for Africa. We show that the differential effect of ruggedness is
statistically significant and economically meaningful, it is found in Africa
only, it cannot be explained by other factors like Africa’s unique geographic
environment, and it is fully accounted for by the history of the slave trades.
I. Introduction
RUGGED terrain is tough to farm, costly to traverse, andoften inhospitable to live in; yet in Africa, countries with
a rugged landscape tend to perform better than flatter ones.
This paper uncovers this paradox and explains it by reaching
back more than two centuries to the slave trades.
In Africa, between 1400 and 1900, four simultaneous slave
trades—across the Atlantic, the Sahara Desert, the Red Sea,
and the Indian Ocean—led to the forced migration of over
18 million people, with many more dying in the process
(Africa’s total population was roughly stable over this period
at 50 million to 70 million). The economies they left behind
were devastated: political institutions collapsed, and soci-
eties fragmented. For African people fleeing the slave trade,
rugged terrain was a positive advantage. Enslavement gener-
ally took place through raids by one group on another, and
hills, caves, and cliff walls provided lookout posts and hiding
places for those trying to escape. Today, that same geographi-
cal ruggedness is an economic handicap, making it expensive
to transport goods, raising the cost of irrigating and farm-
ing the land, and simply making it more expensive to do
business.
We use the historical importance of terrain ruggedness
within Africa to inform the debate that has arisen about the
importance of geography for economic development. While
it is commonly agreed that geography can have important
consequences for economic outcomes, there is a growing
debate over the channel of causality. The traditional focus
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has been on direct contemporaneous effects of geography on
economic outcomes (Kamarck, 1976; Mellinger, Sachs, &
Gallup, 2000; Sachs, 2001; Gallup & Sachs, 2001; Sachs &
Malaney, 2002; Rappaport & Sachs, 2003).1 Recently oth-
ers have argued for a more nuanced effect of geography
on economic outcomes, which works through past interac-
tions with key historical events (Diamond, 1997; Engerman
& Sokoloff, 1997, 2002; Sokoloff & Engerman, 2000; Ace-
moglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001; Acemoglu, Johnson,
& Robinson, 2002). For instance, Acemoglu et al. (2001)
argue that the importance of a disease-prone environment
for current income levels lies in the effect that it had on
potential settler mortality during colonization. In areas where
high mortality discouraged Europeans from settling, coloniz-
ers implemented poor institutions, which adversely affected
subsequent economic development.
Generally it is difficult to estimate the historic indirect
effects of geography. The difficulty arises because locations
are generally affected not only by the historic effect of a
geographical characteristic, but also by any direct effects
that may exist today. Since geographic features are constant
over time, disentangling the two channels is difficult. Our
analysis exploits the fact that the long-term, positive effect
of ruggedness, through fending off slave raiders, is concen-
trated in African countries, where the trades took place. Thus,
we are able to identify the indirect historic effect of terrain
ruggedness that works through the slave trade. We test fur-
ther for this channel by using estimates, constructed by Nunn
(2008), of the number of slaves taken from each country in
Africa.2
We describe in section II how we measure terrain rugged-
ness (data sources for all other variables employed in the
analysis are detailed in the appendix). Then, after introduc-
ing the econometric framework in section III, we investigate
the relationship between ruggedness and income in section
IV. We find strong evidence for a differential positive effect
of the ruggedness in Africa that is both robust and highly
significant. Looking within Africa, in section V, we pro-
vide evidence that the positive effect of ruggedness operates
through the slave trades. We also estimate each of the coeffi-
cients for each of the channels implicit in the indirect effect
of ruggedness. We find support for each of the underlying
relationships: ruggedness negatively affects slave exports,
and slave exports negatively affect the quality of domestic
institutions, an important determinant of per capita income.
1 The geographical characteristics that have been linked to economic out-
comes include a disease-prone environment, proximity to the coast, and the
prevalence of desert or tropical climate.
2 The figures are constructed by combining historical shipping records
with slave inventories reporting slave ethnicities. Nunn (2008) finds that
the slave trades had adverse effects on subsequent economic development
because they weakened indigenous political structures and institutions, and
promoted ethnic and political fragmentation.
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II. Terrain Ruggedness
Ruggedness has a number of effects on income that all
regions of the world experience. The best-established of these
are the contemporary negative effects of ruggedness. Irregu-
lar terrain makes cultivation difficult. On steep slopes, erosion
becomes a potential hazard, and the control of water, such as
irrigation, becomes much more difficult. According to the
Food and Agriculture Organization (1993), when slopes are
greater than 2 degrees, the benefits of cultivation often do
not cover the necessary costs, and when slopes are greater
than 6 degrees, cultivation becomes impossible. In addition,
because of the very high costs involved in earthwork, build-
ing costs are much greater when terrain is irregular (Rapaport
& Snickars, 1999; Nogales, Archondo-Callao, & Bhandari,
2002). As well, transportation over irregular terrain is slower
and more costly.3
Our hypothesis is that within Africa, ruggedness had an
additional historic effect because of Africa’s history of the
slave trades. In Africa, we expect terrain ruggedness also to
have beneficial effects by having helped areas avoid the neg-
ative long-term consequences of the slave trades. The most
common method of enslavement was through raids and kid-
napping by members of one ethnicity on another or even
between members of the same ethnicity (Northrup, 1978;
Lovejoy, 2000). Rugged terrain afforded protection to those
being raided. It provided caves for hiding and the ability to
watch the lowlands and incoming paths. African historians
have documented many examples of this. For instance, Bah
(1976) describes how “throughout time, caverns, caves and
cliff walls have served as places of refuge for people. . . .
There are many examples of this defensive system in Africa.
At Ebarak (south-eastern Senegal), there are still traces left
of a tata wall near a cave in which the Bassaris, escaping
from Fulani raids, hid.” Writing about what is now Mali,
Brasseur (1968) explains that “hidden in the uneven terrain,
they [the Dogon] were able to use the military crests and, as
far as the techniques of war at the time were concerned, were
impregnable.”4
When measuring terrain ruggedness, our purpose is to have
a measure that captures small-scale terrain irregularities, such
as caverns, caves, and cliff walls, that afforded protection to
those being raided during the slave trades. We do so by cal-
culating the terrain ruggedness index, originally devised by
Riley, DeGloria, and Elliot (1999) to quantify topographic
heterogeneity in wildlife habitats that provide hiding for
prey and lookout posts. The main benefits of this measure
are that it quantifies small-scale terrain irregularities, and it
3 A study by Allen, Bourke, and Gibson (2005) highlights these negative
effects of irregular terrain within Papua New Guinea. The authors show that
steep terrain not only makes the production of cash crops very difficult, but
it also makes it much more costly or even impossible to transport the crops
to the markets. The result is that the populations living in these parts of
Papua New Guinea have lower incomes and poorer health.
4 For additional evidence, see Marchesseau (1945), Podlewski (1961),
Gleave and Prothero (1971), Bah (1985, 2003), Cordell (2003), and
Kusimba (2004).
Figure 1.—Schematic of the Terrain Ruggedness Calculation
was designed to capture precisely the type of topographic
features we are interested in. Other measures that economists
and political scientists have used are typically constructed
to capture the presence of large-scale terrain irregularities—
mountains in particular.5 Nevertheless, we will show that the
results are robust to the use of alternative measures of terrain
ruggedness.
Our starting point is GTOPO30 (U.S. Geological Survey,
1996), a global elevation data set developed through a collab-
orative international effort led by staff at the U.S. Geological
Survey’s Center for Earth Resources Observation and Sci-
ence (EROS). Elevations in GTOPO30 are regularly spaced
at 30-arc seconds across the entire surface of the earth on
a map using a geographic projection. The sea-level surface
distance between two adjacent grid points on a meridian is
half a nautical mile or, equivalently, 926 meters.
Figure 1 represents 30-by-30 arc-second cells, with each
cell centered on a point from the GTOPO30 elevation grid.
5 For example, Gerrard (2000) constructs a measure of the percentage of
each country that is covered by mountains, which is used by Fearon and
Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and others in studies of civil war
and conflict. Ramcharan (2006) uses data from the Center for International
Earth Science Information Network (2003) on the percentage of each coun-
try within different elevation ranges in an instrumental-variables analysis of
how economic diversification affects financial diversification. An exception
to the focus on large-scale terrain irregularities is the article by Burchfield
et al. (2006), who construct measures of both small-scale and large-scale
irregularities and show that they have opposite effects on the scattered-
ness of residential development in U.S. metropolitan areas. Burchfield et
al. measure small-scale terrain irregularities using the same terrain rugged-
ness index of Riley et al. (1999) that we use in this paper. Olken (2009)
also uses small-scale terrain irregularities to compute a predicted measure
of the signal strength of television transmissions to Indonesian villages in
his study of the effects of television on social capital.
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The ruggedness calculation takes a point on the earth’s sur-
face like the one marked by a solid circle in the center of
figure 1 and calculates the difference in elevation between
this point and the point on the grid 30 arc-seconds north of it
(the hollow circle directly above it in the figure). The calcu-
lation is performed for each of the eight major directions of
the compass (north, northeast, east, southeast, south, south-
west, west, and northwest). The terrain ruggedness index
at the central point of figure 1 is given by the square root
of the sum of the squared differences in elevation between
the central point and the eight adjacent points. More for-
mally, let er,c denote elevation at the point located in row
r and column c of a grid of elevation points. Then the ter-
rain ruggedness index of Riley et al. (1999) at that point is
calculated as
√∑r+1
i=r−1
∑c+1
i=c−1(ei,j − er,c)2. We then average
across all grid cells in the country not covered by water to
obtain the average terrain ruggedness of the country’s land
area. Since the sea-level surface that corresponds to a 30-by-
30 arc-second cell varies in proportion to the cosine of its
latitude, when calculating the average terrain ruggedness—
or the average of any other variable—for each country, we
weigh each cell by its latitude-varying sea-level surface.
The units for the terrain ruggedness index correspond to
those used to measure elevation differences. In our calcu-
lation, ruggedness is measured in hundreds of meters of
elevation difference for grid points 30 arc-seconds (926
meters on a meridian) apart. Examples of countries with an
average ruggedness that corresponds to nearly level terrain
are the Netherlands (terrain ruggedness 0.037) and Maurita-
nia (0.115). Romania (1.267) and Zimbabwe (1.194) have
mildly rugged terrain on average. Countries with terrain
that is moderately rugged include Italy (2.458) and Djibouti
(2.432). Highly rugged countries include Nepal (5.043) and
Lesotho (6.202). Basic summary statistics for our rugged-
ness measure and correlations with other key variables are
reported in an online appendix.
III. Econometric Framework
We now develop our estimation strategy for investigat-
ing the relationship among ruggedness, the slave trade, and
income. Our starting hypothesis is that ruggedness has an
effect on current income that is the same for all parts of the
world. This relationship can be written as
yi = κ1 − αri + βqi + ei, (1)
where i indexes countries; yi is income per capita; ri is our
measure of ruggedness; qi is a measure of the efficiency
or quality of the organization of society; κ1, α, and β are
constants (α > 0 and β > 0); and ei is a classical error
term (we assume that ei is independent and identically dis-
tributed, drawn from a normal distribution, with a conditional
expectation of 0).
In equation (1), we assume that the common impact of
ruggedness on income is negative. This is not important for
the exposition; it simply anticipates our empirical findings of
a negative common effect of ruggedness. In reality, an impor-
tant part of −α is the effect of ruggedness on income through
increased costs of cultivation, building, and trade. However,
−α may also contain persistent historic effects of ruggedness
that are similar across regions. For example, rugged terrain
may be correlated with historic deposits of precious minerals,
which may have had long-term effects by affecting historic
institutions (Dell, 2010).
Historical studies and the empirical work of Nunn (2008)
have documented that Africa’s slave trades adversely affected
the political and social structures of societies. We capture this
effect of Africa’s slave trades with
qi =
{
κ2 − γxi + ui if i is in Africa,
ui otherwise,
(2)
where xi denotes slave exports,κ2 andγ are constants (γ > 0),
and ui is a classical error term.
Historical accounts argue that the number of slaves taken
from an area was reduced by the ruggedness of the terrain.
This relationship is given by
xi = κ3 − λri + vi, (3)
where κ2 and λ are constants (λ > 0) and vi is a classical
error term.
Equations (1), (2), and (3) are the core relationships in
our analysis. Our first approach is to combine all three by
substituting equations (2) and (3) into (1), which gives
yi =
{
κ1 − αri + βγλri + κ4 + ζi + ξi if i is in Africa,
κ1 − αri + ζi otherwise,
(4)
where κ4 ≡ β(κ2 −γκ3), ζi ≡ ei +βui and ξi ≡ −βγvi. Equa-
tion (4) summarizes the relationships between ruggedness,
the slave trades, and current income. It illustrates the core
hypothesis of this paper: that for African countries, there is
an additional positive historic effect of ruggedness on income
that works through the slave trades βγλ.
Guided by equation (4), we estimate the following rela-
tionship between ruggedness and income:
yi = β0 + β1ri + β2riIAfricai + β3IAfricai + εi, (5)
where IAfricai is an indicator variable that equals 1 if i is in
Africa and 0 otherwise.
Combining our predictions about the relationships among
ruggedness, the slave trades, and income yields a first
hypothesis, which is core to our paper:6
Hypothesis 1. β2 > 0 (in Africa, ruggedness has an
additional positive effect on income).
6 We have implicitly assumed that β2 is the same for all African countries.
In section IV, we relax this assumption and allow the indirect effect of
ruggedness to differ across the regions of Africa.
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We have assumed throughout that the conditional expecta-
tion of each of the error terms in equations (1) to (3) is equal
to 0. In this case, estimating equation (5) provides a consis-
tent estimate of the historic effect of ruggedness in Africa.
In practice, our assumptions rely on there not being variables
that belong in any of the structural equations (1) to (3), but
are omitted from our reduced-form estimating equation (5).
More specifically, in order for an omitted variable to bias
our coefficient of interest—β2 in equation (5)—it must be
the case that either the relationship between income and the
omitted factor is different inside and outside Africa or that
the relationship between the omitted factor and ruggedness
is different inside and outside Africa. For this reason, in our
empirical analysis, we pay particular attention to identify-
ing and including potentially omitted factors for which the
relationship with either income or ruggedness is potentially
different inside and outside Africa.
Equation (5) illustrates the relationship between income
and ruggedness, leaving slave exports in the background.
Recall that we arrived at this equation by substituting equa-
tions (3) and (2) into equation (1). In section V, we bring
slave exports to the foreground by instead substituting only
equation (2) into (1) and estimating equation (3) separately.
This gives us a relationship between income and both rugged-
ness (now only incorporating its common effect) and slave
exports:
yi =
{
κ1 − αri + βκ2 − βγxi + ζi if i is in Africa,
κ1 − αri + ζi otherwise.
(6)
We test this relationship and equation (3) by estimating the
following equations (note that for all non-African countries,
slave exports are 0: xi = 0):
yi = β6 + β7ri + β8riIAfricai + β9IAfricai + β10xi + εi, (7)
xi = β11 + β12ri + 
i. (8)
Estimating equations (7) and (8) allows us to test four
additional hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2. β12 < 0 (ruggedness negatively affects slave
exports).
Hypothesis 3. β10 < 0 (slave exports negatively affect
income).
Hypothesis 4. β8 = 0 (once slave exports are taken into
account, the effect of ruggedness is no different in Africa).
Hypothesis 5. β7 = −α (once slave exports are taken into
account, the coefficient on ruggedness provides a consistent
estimate of the common effect of ruggedness).
Hypothesis 2 and 3 are that ruggedness deterred slave exports
and that slave exports are negatively related to current
income. Hypothesis 4 provides a way of testing whether the
slave trades can fully account for the positive indirect effect
of ruggedness within Africa. If the relationship between
ruggedness and income is different for Africa only because
of the slave trades, then once we control for the effect of the
slave trades on income, there should no longer be a differen-
tial effect of ruggedness for Africa. Hypothesis 5 states that
taking into account the indirect effect of ruggedness by con-
trolling for the slave trades yields a consistent estimate of the
common effect of ruggedness.
IV. The Differential Effect of Ruggedness in Africa
As a first step in our empirical analysis, we now estimate
the common effect of ruggedness on income per person and
its differential effect for Africa. Our baseline estimates of
equation (5) are given in table 1. Looking first at column 1,
when we estimate equation (5) by regressing income per per-
son on ruggedness while allowing for a differential effect in
African countries, we find that the coefficient for ruggedness
is negative and statistically significant: β1 < 0 in equation
(5). This indicates a negative common effect of ruggedness
for the world as a whole. This is consistent with rugged-
ness negatively affecting income by increasing the costs of
trade, construction, and agriculture. Although we cannot rule
out the existence of some positive common consequences of
ruggedness, we find that the net common effect is negative.
The coefficient estimate for ruggedness interacted with an
indicator variable for Africa is positive and statistically sig-
nificant: β2 > 0 in equation (5). This differential effect for
Africa is consistent with hypothesis 1. Within Africa, there
is an additional positive effect of ruggedness on income.
A. Robustness with Respect to Omitted Geographical
Variables
When interpreting our core results regarding the relation-
ship between ruggedness and current economic outcomes, a
possible source of concern is that the estimated differential
effect of ruggedness within Africa may be driven, at least in
part, by other geographical features. However, for an omit-
ted variable to bias our estimated differential effect, it is not
enough that the omitted variable is correlated with income
and ruggedness. It must be the case that either the relation-
ship between the omitted factor and income is different within
and outside Africa, or the relationship between the omitted
factor and ruggedness is different within and outside Africa.
Thus, to deal with potentially omitted differential effects, we
include in our baseline specification of column 1 both the
control variable and an interaction of the control variable
with our Africa indicator variable. By doing this, we allow
the effect of the control variable to differ for Africa.
A potentially confounding factor, which may have dif-
ferential effects within and outside Africa, is the curse of
mineral resources (Sachs & Warner, 2001; Mehlum, Moene,
& Torvik, 2006). If diamond deposits are correlated with
ruggedness, and diamond production increases income out-
side Africa but decreases income within Africa because of
poor institutions, then this could potentially bias the estimated
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Table 1.— The Differential Effect of Ruggedness in Africa
Dependent Variable: Log Real GDP per Person, 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ruggedness −0.203 −0.196 −0.203 −0.243 −0.193 −0.231
(0.093)∗∗ (0.094)∗∗ (0.094)∗∗ (0.092)∗∗∗ (0.081)∗∗ (0.077)∗∗∗
Ruggedness × IAfrica 0.393 0.404 0.406 0.414 0.302 0.321
(0.144)∗∗∗ (0.146)∗∗∗ (0.138)∗∗∗ (0.157)∗∗∗ (0.130)∗∗ (0.127)∗∗
IAfrica −1.948 −2.014 −1.707 −2.066 −1.615 −1.562
(0.220)∗∗∗ (0.222)∗∗∗ (0.325)∗∗∗ (0.324)∗∗∗ (0.295)∗∗∗ (0.415)∗∗∗
Diamonds 0.017 0.028
(0.012) (0.010)∗∗∗
Diamonds × IAfrica −0.014 −0.026
(0.012) (0.011)∗∗
% Fertile soil 0.000 −0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
% Fertile soil × IAfrica −0.008 −0.009
(0.006) (0.007)
% Tropical climate −0.007 −0.009
(0.002)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗
% Tropical climate × IAfrica 0.004 0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
Distance to coast −0.657 −1.039
(0.177)∗∗∗ (0.193)∗∗∗
Distance to coast × IAfrica −0.291 −0.194
(0.360) (0.386)
Constant 9.223 9.204 9.221 9.514 9.388 9.959
(0.143)∗∗∗ (0.148)∗∗∗ (0.200)∗∗∗ (0.164)∗∗∗ (0.134)∗∗∗ (0.195)∗∗∗
Observations 170 170 170 170 170 170
R2 0.357 0.367 0.363 0.405 0.421 0.537
Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
differential effect of ruggedness.7 Column 2 adds to our base-
line specification of column 1 a control variable measuring
carats of gem-quality diamonds extracted per square kilo-
meter between 1958 and 2000 (see the Data Appendix for
details of how this and other geographical controls are con-
structed), as well as an interaction of this control with the
Africa indicator variable. We find weak evidence that the
effect of diamonds is positive in general, but that for African
countries, there is a differential negative effect that nearly
wipes out the general positive effect (however, neither effect
is statistically significant unless we include other controls as
in column 6). The inclusion of this control variable and its
interaction with the Africa indicator variable does not alter
our results regarding the relationship between ruggedness and
current economic outcomes. We have also tried controlling
for other mineral resources, such as oil reserves and gold
(together with an African interaction term). The results are
unaffected by the inclusion of these additional controls.
It is also possible that in general, rugged areas have worse
soil quality, but within Africa, rugged areas have better soil
quality. For example, the Rift Valley region of Africa is
rugged but has very fertile soil. To control for this possi-
bility, we construct a measure of the percentage of fertile soil
in each country. This is defined as soil that is not subject to
severe constraints for growing rain-fed crops in terms of soil
fertility, depth, chemical and drainage properties, or moisture
7 See Mehlum et al. (2006) and Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2006)
for theory and empirical evidence supporting such a differential effect of
resource endowments.
storage capacity and is based on the FAO/UNESCO Digital
Soil Map of the World. In column 3, we add the measure of
soil fertility and its interaction with the Africa indicator vari-
able to our baseline specification. The results show that the
differential effect of ruggedness remains robust to controlling
for soil quality.
A related argument can be made about tropical diseases.
If rugged areas are less prone to tropical diseases within
Africa but not in the rest of the world, then this could poten-
tially bias the estimated differential effect of ruggedness. To
check for this possibility, we add to our baseline specifi-
cation in column 4 a variable measuring the percentage of
each country that has any of the four tropical climates in the
Köppen-Geiger climate classification, as well as an interac-
tion of this variable with the Africa indicator variable. We
see that there is a statistically significant negative relation-
ship between tropical climate and income, but that the effect
is no different for African countries. Our core results are,
once again, unchanged.
We recognize that alternative proxies for tropical diseases
are also possible. For example, one can focus specifically on
malaria and include an index of the stability of malaria trans-
mission from Kiszewski et al. (2004) and the corresponding
African interaction. When we do this, our core results remain
unchanged. The same is also true if we control for the distance
to the equator and the corresponding African interaction.
Motivated by the arguments of Rappaport and Sachs (2003)
and others that coastal access is a fundamental determinant
of income differences, in column 5 we control for the average
distance (measured in thousands of kilometers) to the nearest
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ice-free coast for each country. As before, we also include an
interaction of the distance variable with the African indicator
variable. Our results remain robust. Finally, in column 6, we
include all of the geographic controls and their correspond-
ing interaction terms. We find again that our baseline results
from column 1 are robust to controlling for other geographic
characteristics that could have a differential effect in Africa.8
B. Robustness with Respect to Alternative Income and
Ruggedness Measures
We next consider a number of sensitivity checks to ensure
that the findings documented to this point are in fact robust.
First, one can think of many alternative measures of rugged-
ness. We have chosen to use a well-established measure of
terrain ruggedness that Riley et al. (1999) developed to quan-
tify topographic heterogeneity that creates hiding places and
outlook posts in wildlife habitats. The first robustness check
that we perform is to ensure that our results hold using other
measures of ruggedness. The first alternative measure we con-
sider is the average absolute value of the slope of the terrain.
Thus, using the same GTOPO30 elevation data, we calculate
the average uphill slope of the country’s surface area.9 Our
second alternative measure is the average standard deviation
of elevation within the same eight-cell neighborhood. The
third measure is motivated by the possibility that what mat-
ters is having a large enough amount of sufficiently rugged
terrain nearby, even if some portions of the country are fairly
flat. To capture this logic, we calculate the percentage of
a country’s land area that is highly rugged.10 All of these
measures treat land uniformly when averaging over cells to
construct country averages. Thus, they do not capture the
possibility that ruggedness may be more important (and thus
should be given more weight) in areas that are more densely
populated today. Therefore, our final alternative measure is
a population-weighted measure of ruggedness. We start by
calculating the ruggedness of each 30-by-30 arc-second cell,
but in averaging this for each country, we weight ruggedness
in each cell by the share of the country’s population located
in that cell.11
8 Of independent interest is the relationship between ruggedness and our
set of control variables. We do not find a significant relationship between
ruggedness and either diamond production, soil fertility, or distance from
the coast. We do find a negative relationship between ruggedness and the
fraction of a country that has a tropical climate. As well, we do not find
Africa to be significantly more or less rugged than the rest of the world.
9 For every point on the 30 arc-seconds grid, we calculate the absolute
value of the slope between the point and the eight adjacent points. The
absolute values of the eight slopes are then averaged to calculate the mean
uphill slope for each 30-by-30 arc-second cell. We then average across all
grid cells in a country not covered by water to obtain the average uphill
slope of the country’s land area. Again, our calculations take into account
the latitude-varying sea-level surface that corresponds to the 30-by-30 arc-
second cell centered on each point.
10 We use a threshold set at 240 meters for the terrain ruggedness index
calculated on the 30 arc-seconds grid, below which Riley et al. (1999)
classify terrain as being level to intermediately rugged.
11 The population data are for 2000 and are from the LandScan data set
(Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 2001).
The second robustness check that we perform is a test of
whether our results are robust when we consider income from
other time periods. When looking at time periods earlier than
2000, we turn to data from Maddison (2007), which has much
better historic coverage than the World Bank.12 We find that
our results are robust using income from any year between
1950 and 2000 or for average annual income between 1950
and 2000.
We reestimate our baseline estimating equation with the
full set of controls—the specification in column 6 in table 1—
using all the different combinations of the income and
ruggedness measures. We find that the estimated positive dif-
ferential effect of ruggedness is very robust. In all regressions,
we find that the differential effect of ruggedness within Africa
is positive and statistically significant.13
C. Robustness with Respect to Influential Observations
Next, we check whether the results from table 1 are driven
by some particularly influential outliers. Figure 2 shows a
scatter plot of income per person against ruggedness for
African countries (top panel) and non-African countries (bot-
tom panel). In these plots of the raw data, one observes a
positive relationship for African countries and a negative
relationship for non-African countries. However, a number
of observations appear as clear outliers in terms of their
ruggedness. Our first sensitivity check estimates our baseline
specification, with our full set of control variables, after drop-
ping the ten most rugged countries. The results are presented
in column 1 of table 2.
In the scatter plot, one can also observe that small coun-
tries (based on land area) tend to have either unusually high
ruggedness (for example, Seychelles, identified in the figure
by its ISO 3166-1 code SYC) or low ruggedness (for exam-
ple, Saint Kitts and Nevis, KNA). Given this, we perform
a second robustness check where the ten smallest countries
are omitted from the sample. The estimates are reported in
column 2 of table 2.14
We next adopt a more systematic approach to deal with
influential observations and remove influential observations
using each observation’s DFBETA, a measure of the differ-
ence in the estimated coefficient for the ruggedness interac-
tion (scaled by the standard error) when the observation is
included and when it is excluded from the sample. Following
Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980), we omit all observations
for which |DFBETAi| > 2/
√
N , where N is the number of
12 For 2000, Maddison (2007) has data for only 159 countries, compared
to 170 for the World Bank. But once one starts to move back in time,
Maddison’s coverage is much better than the World Bank’s. For example,
prior to 1980, the World Bank does not have data on real per capita PPP-
adjusted GDP. Maddison has data for 137 countries as far back as 1950.
13 For brevity, we do not report the results here. See the online appendix
for the complete results.
14 A related concern is that our results may be driven by atypical African
countries, such as island countries or North African countries. Our results
are also robust to omitting these countries from the sample.
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Figure 2.—Income and Ruggedness among African and non-African Countries
observations—in our case, 170.15 Results are presented in
column 3 of table 2.
In all three of the regressions with omitted observations,
the ruggedness coefficient remains negative and statistically
significant, and the ruggedness interaction remains positive
15 Using other measures and rules for the omission of influential observa-
tions, such as DFITS, Cook’s distance, or Welsch distance, provides very
similar results.
and statistically significant, confirming the existence of a
differential effect of ruggedness within Africa.
In figure 2, a small number of observations appear as partic-
ularly influential because the ruggedness measure is skewed
to the left, leaving a small number of observations with large
values. We remedy this in two ways. First, we take the natural
log of ruggedness and use this in the estimating equations.
This draws in the outlying observations in the regression.
The estimates of interest, reported in column 4 in table 2,
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Table 2.—Robustness with Respect to Influential Observations
Dependent Variable: Log Real GDP per Person, 2000
Omit 10 Omit 10 Omit if Using Box-Cox Transformation
Most Rugged Smallest |DFBETA| > 2/√N ln(Ruggedness) of Ruggedness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ruggedness −0.202 −0.221 −0.261 −0.171 −0.249
(0.083)∗∗ (0.083)∗∗∗ (0.068)∗∗∗ (0.051)∗∗∗ (0.075)∗∗∗
Ruggedness × IAfrica 0.286 0.188 0.223 0.234 0.333
(0.133)∗∗ (0.099)∗ (0.116)∗ (0.119)∗∗ (0.142)∗∗
IAfrica −1.448 −1.465 −1.510 −1.083 −1.139
(0.454)∗∗∗ (0.405)∗∗∗ (0.406)∗∗∗ (0.394)∗∗∗ (0.391)∗∗∗
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 160 160 164 170 170
R2 0.520 0.545 0.564 0.527 0.533
Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. All regressions include a constant, and our full set of control variables: diamonds,
diamonds × IAfrica , % fertile soil, % fertile soil × IAfrica , % tropical climate, % tropical climate × IAfrica , distance to coast, and distance to coast × IAfrica . Coefficients and standard errors for the control variable are
reported in the online appendix.
remain robust to this transformation. However, looking at the
natural log of ruggedness variable, one finds that the mea-
sure is no longer left skewed; it is now right skewed, with a
small number of influential observations taking on very small
values. Because of this, we pursue a second strategy where
we perform a zero-skewness Box-Cox power transformation
on the ruggedness variable to obtain a measure with zero
skewness. The relationships between income and the zero-
skewness ruggedness measure are shown in figure 3. It is
evident that the relationships between income and ruggedness
using the zero-skewness measure do not feature influential,
outlying observations. In addition, a different relationship
within Africa and outside Africa is still apparent in the scatter
plots of the data. Estimates using the zero-skewness measure
are reported in column 5. The estimates confirm the impres-
sion given by the figures. There is a positive and significant
differential effect of ruggedness within Africa.
D. Do Other African Characteristics or Colonial Rule
Explain the Differential Effect of Ruggedness?
A final possible source of concern is that the differen-
tial effect of ruggedness for Africa is not really an African
effect. Perhaps it arises because the effect of ruggedness on
income differs for areas with some geographic characteris-
tic that happens to be particularly prevalent in Africa. For
instance, it could be that in countries where a large fraction
of the territory experiences tropical climates, rugged areas
are cooler, dryer, or even less prone to tropical diseases. If
tropical climates are particularly prevalent in Africa (they
characterize 34.0% of land in Africa compared with 19.3%
of the rest of the world, excluding Antarctica), perhaps the
interaction between ruggedness and the Africa indicator is
proxying for an interaction between ruggedness and tropi-
cal climates. Similarly, it could be that in countries where
a large fraction of the territory is covered by dry, unfertile
soil like desert, rugged areas are less arid. If areas with poor
soil are particularly prevalent in Africa (fertile soil comprises
22.5% of the land in Africa compared with 25.3% in the rest
of the world, excluding Antarctica), perhaps the interaction
between ruggedness and the Africa indicator is proxying for
an interaction between ruggedness and poor soil quality.
We consider these possibilities in columns 1 to 3 of table 3,
where we add to our baseline estimating equation variables
measuring the percentage of each country with tropical cli-
mates and the percentage of each country with fertile soil
(these can be seen as playing the same role as the Africa indi-
cator), as well as interactions between ruggedness and these
two variables (these can be seen as playing the same role
as the interaction between ruggedness and the Africa indica-
tor).16 In columns 1 and 2, we include each of the two sets
of controls one at a time, and in column 3, we include them
together. The coefficients of interest, measuring the common
effect of ruggedness and the differential effect for Africa,
change little and remain statistically significant.17
We next consider the possibility that our Africa indicator
variable may be picking up the prevalence of colonial rule.
In areas that were colonized, rugged terrain may have pro-
vided a way to defend against colonial rule. Since a greater
proportion of countries in Africa, relative to the rest of the
world, experienced colonial rule (within Africa, 89.5% of the
countries were colonized, while outside Africa, this figure is
44.1%), the differential effect of ruggedness in Africa may
be biased by a differential effect of ruggedness in countries
that were colonized.
We control for this possibility in columns 4 and 5 of table 3.
In column 4, we include five indicator variables for the iden-
tity of a country’s colonizer, with the omitted category being
16 The results are also robust if we use a measure of the proportion of a
country’s land that is desert rather than the proportion with fertile soil.
17 One could also think that certain countries, because of inferior access to
technology or poor governance, are worse equipped to mitigate the common
negative effects of ruggedness. However, note that this would work against
estimating a positive differential effect of ruggedness within Africa, since
access to technology and governance is likely to be worse on average in
Africa. A further concern is that the tropical climate measure is potentially
endogenous to ruggedness, since some areas may not be classified as tropical
if they are rugged. A preferable measure would quantify how tropical a
climate would be if it were not rugged. Using a country’s distance from the
equator as a proxy for this measure yields very similar results.
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Figure 3.—Income and Ruggedness (Box-Cox Transformed) among African and non-African Countries
for countries that were not colonized.18 We also include the
set of colonizer indicator variables interacted with rugged-
ness. The differential effect of ruggedness remains positive
and statistically significant.
Numerous studies have shown that differences in the legal
origin of the colonizing powers are an important determinant
18 The five categories for the identity of the colonizer are British,
Portuguese, French, Spanish, and other European.
of a variety of country characteristics, including financial
development, labor market regulations, contract enforce-
ment, and economic growth (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, &
Shleifer, 2008). Given the particular strong impact of colonial
rule that works through legal origin, we also control directly
for each country’s legal origin by including four legal origin
indicator variables and their interactions with ruggedness.
The four indicators are for French, German, Scandinavian,
and socialist legal origins, with the omitted category being
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Table 3.—Considering Differential Effects of Ruggedness by Characteristics Prevalent in Africa
Dependent Variable: Log Real GDP per Person, 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ruggedness −0.259 −0.322 −0.374 −0.386 −0.543
(0.101)∗∗ (0.160)∗∗ (0.161)∗∗ (0.176)∗∗ (0.179)∗∗∗
Ruggedness × IAfrica 0.357 0.400 0.360 0.399 0.435
(0.130)∗∗∗ (0.155)∗∗∗ (0.140)∗∗ (0.203)∗∗ (0.135)∗∗∗
IAfrica −1.814 −1.977 −1.818 −1.740 −1.994
(0.213)∗∗∗ (0.223)∗∗∗ (0.218)∗∗∗ (0.337)∗∗∗ (0.216)∗∗∗
Ruggedness × % tropical climate Yes No Yes Yes Yes
% Tropical climate Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Ruggedness × % fertile soil No Yes Yes Yes Yes
% Fertile soil No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ruggedness × colonizer FEs No No No Yes No
Colonizer FEs No No No Yes No
Ruggedness × legal origin FEs No No No No Yes
Legal origin FEs No No No No Yes
Observations 170 170 170 170 170
R2 0.404 0.363 0.408 0.430 0.559
Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
British legal origin. The positive differential effect of rugged-
ness remains when accounting for differences in countries’
legal origins.
E. Differential Effects of Ruggedness across Regions within
Africa
One concern with the results presented to this point is that
we allow only the effect of ruggedness on economic outcomes
to differ for African countries. We have also checked whether
one also finds a positive and statistically significant differ-
ential effect of ruggedness within other parts of the world.
Treating other continents in the exact same manner that we
have treated Africa in equation (5) (including a continent
indicator and an indicator interacted with ruggedness), we
find that for no other continent is there a positive and statis-
tically significant differential effect of ruggedness. In other
words, the positive differential effect of ruggedness is unique
to Africa, and is not found in North America, South America,
Europe, Asia, or Oceania.
Having determined that the differential effect of rugged-
ness is specific to the African continent, we examine whether
the strength of the effect differs across the regions within
Africa in a manner that is consistent with the known his-
tory of the slave trades. Our argument is that ruggedness
has a differential positive effect within Africa because no
other continent was subject to the slave trades that devastated
Africa between 1400 and 1900. However, the exposure to
the slave trades was not uniform across the continent. West
Africa was the region most severely affected by the slave
trades, whereas North Africa was barely touched.19 Thus, the
19 The correlation between our measure of slave exports, described in
detail in the next section, and a West Africa indicator variable is 0.53 and is
statistically significant. The correlation between slave exports and a North
Africa indicator variable is −0.30 and is also statistically significant. For
all other African regions, the correlation between slave exports and a region
indicator variable is not statistically different from 0.
logic of our core argument suggests that ruggedness should
have a more beneficial effect within West Africa, where the
threat of being enslaved was greatest, but within North Africa,
where slave capture was nearly absent, the effect should be
much smaller and not very different from that in the rest
of the world. To check this, we examine the five regions of
Africa defined by Bratton and van de Walle (1997): West
Africa, Central Africa, North Africa, South Africa, and East
Africa. We construct an indicator variable for each region
and then individually include each indicator variable and its
interaction with ruggedness in equation (5). The estimates
are reported in table 4. The results show that for West Africa
and North Africa, there is a statistically different effect of
ruggedness relative to the average for all of Africa. Within
West Africa, the positive effect of ruggedness is significantly
larger. This is consistent with the positive effect of rugged-
ness working through the slave trades and with West Africa
being the region most severely affected by the slave trades.
In North Africa, where slave capture was almost completely
absent, there is no positive effect of ruggedness.20 The results
also show that the other three regions lie between these two
extremes. For these regions, the positive differential effect of
ruggedness is not statistically different from that for Africa
as a whole.
Our finding that, across regions within Africa, the mag-
nitudes of the differential effects of the ruggedness align
closely with the intensity of the slave trades provide sugges-
tive evidence that the differential effect of ruggedness within
Africa is intimately linked to the slave trades. In the follow-
ing sections, we examine this directly and provide additional
evidence that this is in fact the case.
20 This is calculated by adding the coefficient of the North Africa interac-
tion to the coefficient of the Africa interaction. This gives 0.406+−0.404 =
−0.002.
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Table 4.—Differential Effects of Ruggedness across Regions within Africa
Dependent Variable: Log Real GDP per Person, 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ruggedness −0.203 −0.203 −0.203 −0.203 −0.203
(0.093)∗∗ (0.093)∗∗ (0.093)∗∗ (0.093)∗∗ (0.093)∗∗
Ruggedness × IAfrica 0.312 0.408 0.409 0.406 0.448
(0.159)∗∗ (0.161)∗∗ (0.147)∗∗∗ (0.147)∗∗∗ (0.179)∗∗
IAfrica −1.735 −1.844 −2.008 −2.046 −2.054
(0.291)∗∗∗ (0.229)∗∗∗ (0.230)∗∗∗ (0.222)∗∗∗ (0.232)∗∗∗
Ruggedness × IWest Africa 0.532
(0.154)∗∗∗
IWest Africa −0.635
(0.283)∗∗
Ruggedness × IEast Africa 0.162
(0.274)
IEast Africa −0.760
(0.532)
Ruggedness × ICentral Africa 0.575
(1.197)
ICentral Africa 0.020
(0.597)
Ruggedness × INorth Africa −0.404
(0.131)∗∗∗
INorth Africa 1.465
(0.241)∗∗∗
Ruggedness × ISouth Africa −0.200
(0.195)
ISouth Africa 0.592
(0.519)
Constant 9.223 9.223 9.223 9.223 9.223
(0.144)∗∗∗ (0.144)∗∗∗ (0.144)∗∗∗ (0.144)∗∗∗ (0.144)∗∗∗
Observations 170 170 170 170 170
R2 0.367 0.368 0.359 0.375 0.363
Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
V. Do Slave Exports Account for Africa’s
Differential Effect?
We now examine whether the slave trades can account for
the differential effect of ruggedness within Africa. Our first
step is to check for direct evidence that ruggedness provided
protection against slave raiding. We do this using data from
Nunn (2008) on the number of slaves taken from each country
between 1400 and 1900 during Africa’s four slave trades.
The figures are constructed by combining historical shipping
records with slave inventories reporting slave ethnicities (see
the data appendix and Nunn, 2008, for details). Because the
variable is very skewed to the left and some countries have
no slave exports, we take the natural logarithm of 1 plus the
measure: ln(1 + slave exports/area). Using these data, we
estimate equation (8) from section III. Results are reported
in columns 5 to 7 of table 5.
Column 5 of table 5 reports the unconditional relationship
between ruggedness and slave exports among the 49 African
countries in our sample. The estimate shows a negative and
statistically significant relationship between ruggedness and
slave exports and that ruggedness alone explains almost 30%
of the variation in slave exports. This confirms hypothesis 2:
β12 < 0 in equation (8). In columns 6 and 7, we include
additional variables to address several potential concerns
regarding the relationship between ruggedness and slave
exports. We first include our baseline set of control vari-
ables. Among the four controls, the fraction of fertile soil
is the only covariate that is statistically significant. The pos-
itive coefficient likely reflects the fact that soil fertility was
an important determinant of having a dense and sedentary
initial population, which led to more slaves being captured.
In column 7, we include additional controls for other fac-
tors that may be important determinants of slave exports.
We control directly for log population density in 1400. This
is a particularly important characteristic, since it is possible
that the reason fewer slaves were taken from countries with
greater terrain ruggedness is that there were fewer people liv-
ing in more rugged areas, and not just because rugged terrain
provided protection. The variable has a positive and statis-
tically significant coefficient. Since Nunn (2008) shows that
slave exports are decreasing in the distance from each coun-
try to the closest final destination in each of the four slave
trades, we also include the sailing distance from each coun-
try’s coast to the closest final destination for the transatlantic
and Indian Ocean slave trades and the overland distance to
the closest final destination for the trans-Saharan and Red
Sea slave trades (measured in thousands of kilometers). For
the transatlantic and Indian Ocean slave trades, in addition to
the voyage by ship, slaves captured inland would have to be
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Table 5.—The Impact and Determinants of Slave Exports
Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable:
Log Real GDP Slave Export
per Person, 2000 Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Slave export intensity −0.203 −0.222 −0.206 −0.214
(0.037)∗∗∗ (0.035)∗∗∗ (0.036)∗∗∗ (0.034)∗∗∗
Ruggedness −0.203 −0.169 −0.231 −0.220 −1.330 −1.326 −0.989
(0.093)∗∗ (0.077)∗∗ (0.077)∗∗∗ (0.066)∗∗∗ (0.262)∗∗∗ (0.274)∗∗∗ (0.358)∗∗∗
Ruggedness × IAfrica 0.124 0.047
(0.152) (0.143)
IAfrica −0.819 −0.591 −0.825 −0.728
(0.317)∗∗∗ (0.222)∗∗∗ (0.356)∗∗ (0.354)∗∗
Diamonds 0.028 0.028 −0.005 −0.001
(0.010)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗ (0.006) (0.005)
Diamonds × IAfrica −0.027 −0.027
(0.010)∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗
% fertile soil −0.002 −0.002 0.042 0.031
(0.003) (0.003) (0.015)∗∗∗ (0.019)
% fertile soil × IAfrica 0.000 0.001
(0.006) (0.006)
% tropical climate −0.009 −0.009 0.013 0.003
(0.002)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.009) (0.010)
% tropical climate × IAfrica 0.009 0.008
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗
Distance to coast −1.039 −1.039 0.154 −1.939
(0.194)∗∗∗ (0.194)∗∗∗ (1.174) (1.694)
Distance to coast × IAfrica −0.162 −0.191
(0.321) (0.343)
Log population density 1400 0.326
(0.179)∗
Dist. Saharan slave market −1.670
(0.914)∗
Dist. Atlantic slave market −0.973
(0.480)∗∗
Dist. Red Sea slave market −0.082
(0.635)
Dist. Indian slave market −0.925
(0.486)∗
Constant 9.223 9.175 9.959 9.943 5.572 3.575 22.359
(0.144)∗∗∗ (0.127)∗∗∗ (0.195)∗∗∗ (0.195)∗∗∗ (0.503)∗∗∗ (1.251)∗∗∗ (10.008)∗∗
Observations 170 170 170 170 49 49 49
R2 0.418 0.415 0.586 0.585 0.289 0.448 0.587
Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
brought to the coast. Our distance-to-coast variable accounts
for this.21 The ruggedness coefficient remains negative and
significant at the 1% level even after controlling for these
additional factors.
Having established that rugged terrain deterred slave
exports, we now turn to showing that slave exports are neg-
atively related to current economic outcomes and that this
fully accounts for the differential effect of ruggedness within
Africa. In column 1 of table 5, we estimate equation (7) from
section III. This is identical to equation (5) (for which we
reported estimates in column 1 of table 1), except that slave
exports are also included in the estimating equation. Column
3 reports the same estimation as column 1 except that we also
21 It is possible that land sufficiently distant from the coast was not exposed
to the slave trades and that therefore a measure that places greater emphasis
on the amount of land below a threshold distance from the coast is a more
precise determinant. If we use the percentage of a country’s land area that
is more than 100 kilometers from the coast instead of the distance to the
nearest coast, the results are qualitatively identical.
include our baseline set of control variables from table 1 in
the estimating equation. With or without the full set of con-
trols, when slave exports are controlled for, the differential
effect of ruggedness within Africa disappears. The estimated
coefficient on ruggedness ·IAfrica is close to 0 and is no longer
statistically significant. This confirms hypothesis 4: β8 = 0 in
equation (7). It provides support for the explanation that the
differential effect of ruggedness arises because of the slave
trades.
In columns 2 and 4, we reestimate the specifications of,
respectively, columns 1 and 3, leaving out the interaction
between ruggedness and the Africa indicator variable. The
estimates confirm hypothesis 3, which states that current eco-
nomic outcomes in Africa are worse in places more affected
by the slave trades: β10 < 0 in equation (7). We can also see
in columns 2 and 4 that the common effect of ruggedness,
once slave exports are accounted for, is negative and very
close to the magnitudes from columns 1 and 6 of table 1.
This confirms hypothesis 5, which states that β7 in equation
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(7) provides a consistent estimate of the common effect of
ruggedness on income for the world as a whole.22
The estimates from table 5 can be used to calculate an
alternative estimate of the indirect historic effect of rugged-
ness on income. The coefficients for slave export intensity
from columns 1 and 3 provide estimates of the effect of slave
exports on income: βγ from equation (6). The coefficients for
ruggedness from columns 5 to 7 provide estimates of λ from
equation (1). Therefore, the product of the two coefficients
provides an alternative estimate of the indirect historic effect
of ruggedness βγλ. Because this is a direct estimate of the
effect of ruggedness that works through the slave trades, it is
potentially more precise than our reduced-form estimate—β2
from equation (5)—which is based solely on the differential
effect of ruggedness within Africa.
Consider the estimates with our baseline set of control
variables, reported in columns 4 and 6 of table 5. They
give β̂γ = −0.206 and ˆλ = −1.326. Therefore, β̂γ ˆλ =
−0.206 ×−1.326 = 0.273. We can compare this estimate to
our reduced-form estimate reported in column 6 of table 1,
which is 0.321. The indirect effect of ruggedness working
through slave exports is almost identical to the reduced-form
differential effect of ruggedness within Africa estimated in
section IV. This provides reassuring confirmation that the
reduced-form differential effect of ruggedness within Africa
is in fact being driven by the historic effect of ruggedness
working through Africa’s slave trades.
A. Economic Magnitude of the Effects
To this point, we have been focusing on the statistical
significance of our estimated coefficients, ignoring the mag-
nitude of their effects. Using the estimates from table 5, we
now undertake a number of counterfactual calculations to
show that the economic magnitudes of the indirect historic
impact of ruggedness, working through the slave trades, are
substantial.
We first consider the estimated magnitude of the impact
of the slave trades on income. For context, consider a hypo-
thetical African country with the mean level of slave exports
and mean log real GDP per person among African coun-
tries. According to the estimates from column 3 of table 5, if
this country was instead completely untouched by the slave
trades, then its per capita income would increase by $2,365,
from $1,784 to $4,149.23
We next consider the magnitude of the historic benefit
of ruggedness, which occurs through reduced slave exports.
22 If we estimate equation (7) without controlling for slave exports, then we
estimate a small negative coefficient for ruggedness that is not significantly
different from 0 (coefficient −0.067 with standard error 0.082). This is
as expected. The negative common effect of ruggedness is biased upward
(toward 0), since the positive effect of ruggedness within Africa is not being
taken into account.
23 This is calculated from: ln y′ = ln 1, 784 − 0.206 × (−4.09), where
4.09 is the mean slave export intensity measure among African countries,
−0.206 is the estimated impact of slave exports on income (from column 3
of table 5), and y′ denotes the counterfactual income, had the slave trades
not occurred in the hypothetical country. Solving for y′ gives $4,149.
Consider the benefit of a 1 standard deviation increase in
ruggedness from the average of 1.110 to 2.389. According to
the estimates from column 6 of table 5, this reduces slave
exports by 1.326 × 1.279 = 1.70, which is a 0.54 stan-
dard deviation decline in slave export intensity. This in turn
increases log real GDP per person by $747, from the average
$1,784 to $2,531, which is a 0.37 standard deviation increase
in log income per person.24
These effects are substantial, particularly given that we
are considering the historic impact of one very specific geo-
graphic characteristic, terrain ruggedness, working through
one historic event, the slave trades.
B. The Effect of Slave Exports on Income through Rule of Law
We have so far estimated the indirect effect of ruggedness
on income,βγλ, in two ways: (a) estimating the reduced-form
relationship between income and ruggedness from equation
(4) to obtain the combined differential effect of ruggedness
within Africa β̂γλ and (b) estimating separately the effect of
ruggedness on slave exports from equation (1) to obtain ˆλ
and the effect of slave exports on income of equation (6) to
obtain β̂γ. A third alternative is to estimate equations (1) to
(3) separately to obtain ˆλ, ˆβ, and γˆ independently. One prob-
lem with this third alternative is that it is difficult to obtain
an appropriate measure for qi, which summarizes the differ-
ent aspects of the organization of societies that are negatively
affected by the slave trades. As a partial step in this direction,
we use the rule-of-law variable from the World Bank’s World-
wide Governance Indicators database (Kaufmann, Kraay, &
Mastruzzi, 2008). Estimates of equations (1) and (2) using
this variable are reported in table 6.
The first two columns of the table report estimates of equa-
tion (1), which captures the effects of institutional quality, as
proxied by the rule of law, on real per capita income in 2000.
In column 1, we control for the Africa indicator variable only,
and in column 2 we also control for our standard set of con-
trol variables and their interactions with the Africa indicator
variable. The estimates show a strong negative, and statis-
tically significant, relationship between the rule of law and
per capita income. This result confirms the findings from a
number of previous studies that stress the importance of gov-
ernance and domestic institutions for long-term economic
development (Acemoglu et al., 2001).
Columns 3 to 5 of table 6 report estimates of equation
(2), which models the relationship between slave exports and
the quality of the organization of societies. The estimates
of column 3 control for the Africa indicator variable only.
We include the Africa indicator to ensure that our estimated
effect of slave exports on institutional quality is not estimated
from the difference between Africa and the rest of the world.
24 This is calculated from: ln y′ = ln 1, 784 − 0.206 × (−1.326 × 1.279),
where 1.279 is the standard deviation of ruggedness among African coun-
tries, −1.326 is the estimated impact of ruggedness on slave exports (from
column 6 of table 5), and −0.206 is the estimated impact of slave exports
on income (from column 3 of table 5). Solving for y′ gives $2,531.
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Table 6.—The Effect of Slave Exports on Income through Rule of Law
Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable:
Log Real GDP Rule of
per Person, 2000 Law
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rule of law, 1996–2000 0.871 0.813
(0.044)∗∗∗ (0.059)∗∗∗
Ruggedness −0.034 −0.051 −0.147 −0.156
(0.041) (0.039) (0.067)∗∗ (0.049)∗∗∗
IAfrica −0.699 −0.109 −0.509 −0.885 −0.935
(0.131)∗∗∗ (0.352) (0.188)∗∗∗ (0.306)∗∗∗ (0.344)∗∗∗
Slave export intensity −0.086 −0.098 −0.100
(0.031)∗∗∗ (0.034)∗∗∗ (0.033)∗∗∗
Diamonds 0.009 0.028 0.019
(0.014) (0.009)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗
Diamonds × IAfrica −0.009 −0.026 −0.017
(0.015) (0.009)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗
% Fertile soil 0.000 −0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
% Fertile soil × IAfrica −0.015 0.011 0.006
(0.006)∗∗ (0.005)∗∗ (0.005)
% Tropical climate −0.002 −0.010 −0.011
(0.001) (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗
% Tropical climate × IAfrica 0.003 0.004 0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)∗∗
Distance to coast −0.221 −0.984 −0.427
(0.174) (0.189)∗∗∗ (0.162)∗∗∗
Distance to coast × IAfrica −0.576 0.233 −0.340
(0.347)∗ (0.296) (0.270)
IFrench civil law −0.528
(0.157)∗∗∗
IFrench civil law × IAfrica 0.463
(0.230)∗∗
ISocialist law −1.183
(0.192)∗∗∗
IGerman civil law 0.640
(0.331)∗
IScandinavian law 0.774
(0.209)∗∗∗
Constant 8.783 8.922 0.218 1.113 1.244
(0.076)∗∗∗ (0.159)∗∗∗ (0.087)∗∗ (0.198)∗∗∗ (0.226)∗∗∗
Observations 169 169 169 169 169
R2 0.746 0.776 0.191 0.449 0.644
Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Because slave exports are 0 for all countries outside Africa
and because we always control for an Africa fixed effect, the
estimated coefficient for slave exports is estimated from the
relationship between slave exports and institutional quality
within Africa only. In columns 4 and 5, we include addi-
tional control variables. We first include our baseline set of
control variables and their interactions with the Africa indica-
tor variable. Then, in column 5, we also add our legal origin
fixed effects and their interactions with the Africa indica-
tor variable.25 The estimates provide strong support for the
slave trade adversely affecting domestic institutions today.
25 Because our regression includes an Africa indicator variable, a full set of
legal origin indicator variables, and interactions between them, non-African
British common law countries constitute the omitted baseline category.
Therefore, the differential effect (relative to this baseline) of the other legal
origins for non-African countries is given by the coefficients of the legal
origin indicator variables, while the differential effect of the other legal
origins for African countries is given by the interaction of the legal origin
indicators with the Africa indicator variable. Because African countries
are only of either British or French legal origin, and none are of socialist,
German, or Scandinavian legal origin, indicator variables for these later
The coefficient for slave exports is negative and statistically
significant.
Combining the estimated coefficients ˆλ = −1.326 from
column 6 of table 5, ˆβ = 0.813 from column 2 of table 6, and
γˆ = −0.065 from column (4) of table 6 yields ˆλ × ˆβ × γˆ =
0.070. Like the reduced-form estimate from column 6 of
table 1, the indirect effect of ruggedness is found to be
positive. However, the magnitude from the structural esti-
mates is just under one-fourth of the magnitude implied by
the reduced-form estimate. This occurs because our struc-
tural estimates implicitly assume that the only effect of slave
exports on income is through the rule of law. Any effect
of the slave trade on per capita income that does not occur
through our measured rule of law will not be captured when
we estimate β and γ individually. This is not true, however,
for our estimate of the relationship between slave exports
three groups interacted with the Africa indicator variable are dropped from
the regression.
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and income, β̂γ = −0.206. The relationship between slave
exports and income implied by the individual estimates of β
and γ is ˆβ× γˆ = 0.813 × −0.065 = −0.053. The difference
between the two estimated magnitudes is consistent with the
slave trade affecting income through channels other than the
rule of law. Exploring such channels is the subject of ongo-
ing research. For instance, the recent results of Nunn and
Wantchekon (forthcoming), which show that the slave trades
had a negative effect on levels of trust 100 years after the
end of the trade, provide evidence that the slave trades likely
affect current income levels through a variety of additional
channels other than the rule of law.26
VI. Conclusions
The study provides evidence showing that geography can
have important effects on income through its interaction with
historical events. By focusing on a dimension of geography,
terrain ruggedness, which varies throughout the world and
on a historical event, the slaves trades over the period 1400
to 1900, which is geographically confined to Africa, we are
able to estimate the indirect historic effect of ruggedness on
income. For the world as a whole, we find a negative rela-
tionship between ruggedness on income. We also find that
rugged terrain had an additional effect in Africa during the fif-
teenth to nineteenth centuries: it afforded protection to those
being raided during Africa’s slave trades. By allowing areas
to escape from the detrimental effects that the slave trades had
on subsequent economic development, ruggedness also cre-
ates long-run benefits in Africa through an indirect historic
channel. We show that this differential effect of ruggedness
is found in Africa only, it cannot be explained by Africa’s
unique geographic environment, and it is fully accounted for
by Africa’s slave trades. On the whole, the results provide
one example of the importance of geography through historic
channels.
26 An additional channel through which the slave trades can negatively
affect income today is ethnic conflict. Slaves were almost exclusively cap-
tured by other Africans (Koelle, 1854; Nunn & Wantchekon, forthcoming).
This triggered conflicts between neighboring ethnicities, which may still
persist today (Azevedo, 1982; Inikori, 2000; Hubbell, 2001). Identifying
this channel empirically is difficult because it is possible that the seeds of
ethnic conflict were planted before the slave trades and we do not have data
on ethnic conflict prior to the slave trades. However, we note that our results
are robust to controlling for years of violent civil conflict, 1975–1999, using
data from Fearon and Laitin (2003).
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DATA APPENDIX
Data Availability
All the data necessary to reproduce the results of this paper are available
from http://diegopuga.org/data/rugged/.
Country Boundaries
We assign geographic features to countries using digital boundary data
based on the fifth edition of the Digital Chart of the World (U.S. National
Imagery and Mapping Agency, 2000), which we have updated to reflect
country boundaries in 2000 using information from the International Orga-
nization for Standardization ISO 3166 Maintenance Agency and other
sources. We exclude areas covered by inland water area features contained
in the same edition of the Digital Chart of the World. When calculating the
percentage of each country’s land surface area with certain characteristics
or the average value of a variable for a country, we perform all calculations
on a 30 arc-second geographic grid, correcting for the fact that the actual
land area covered by a 30 arc-second cell varies with latitude.
Land Area
The land area data are from the Food and Agriculture Organization
(2008), except for Macau and Hong Kong where they are taken from the
Encyclopedia Britannica.
Income per Person
We measure average country-level income by the natural logarithm of
real GDP per person in 2000. The data are from the World Bank World
Development Indicators (2006). Units are 2006 international dollars, with
purchasing power parity conversions performed using the Elteto-Koves-
Szulc method.
To check the robustness of our results to the use of income data from
other time periods and from an alternative source, in the text we refer to
results using the natural logarithm of real GDP per person in 1950 and in
2000, and its annual average from 1950 to 2000, with data from Angus
Maddison (Maddison, 2007, updated October 2008). Units are 1990 inter-
national dollars, with purchasing power parity conversions performed using
the Geary-Khamis method.
Gem-Quality Diamond Extraction
Data on carats of gem-quality diamond extracted by each country
between 1958 and 2000 are obtained from the 1959 to 2004 editions of
the Mineral Yearbook, published first by the U.S. Bureau of Mines (1960–
1996) and then by the us Geological Survey (1997–2007). We use the
most recent data for each country-year in volume 1 (Metals and Minerals),
completed with data from volume 3 (Area Reports: International) of the
1997–2000 editions. For countries that have split or changed boundaries,
we assign diamond extraction on the basis of mine location with respect to
current boundaries. The variable is then normalized by land area to obtain
carats of gem-quality diamond per square kilometer.
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Percentage of Each Country with Fertile Soil
On the basis of the FAO/UNESCO Digital Soil Map of the World and
linked soil association composition table and climatic data compiled by
the Climate Research Unit of the University of East Anglia, Fischer et al.
(2002) identify whether each cell on a 5-minute grid covering almost the
entire land area of the earth is subject to various constraints for growing rain-
fed crops. Based on plates 20 (soil moisture storage capacity constraints),
21 (soil depth constraints), 22 (soil fertility constraints), 23 (soil drainage
constraints), 24 (soil texture constraints), and 25 (soil chemical constraints)
in Fischer et al. (2002) and the country boundaries described above, we
calculate the percentage of the land surface area of each country that has
fertile soil (defined as soil that is not subject to severe constraints for growing
rain-fed crops in terms of either soil fertility, depth, chemical and drainage
properties, or moisture storage capacity). Cape Verde, French Polynesia,
Mauritius, and Seychelles are not covered by the Fischer et al. (2002) data,
so for these countries, we use the percentage of their land surface area that
is classified by the Food and Agriculture Organization (2008) as arable land
or permanent crop land.
Percentage of Each Country with Tropical Climate
Using detailed temperature and precipitation data from the Climatic
Research Unit of the University of East Anglia and the Global Precipitation
Climatology Centre of the German Weather Service, Kottek et al. (2006)
classify each cell on a 30 arc-minute grid covering the entire land area of
the earth into one of 31 climates in the widely used Köppen-Geiger climate
classification. Based on these data and the country boundaries described
above, we calculate the percentage of the land surface area of each country
that has any of the four Köppen-Geiger tropical climates.
Average Distance to the Nearest Ice-Free Coast
To calculate the average distance to the closest ice-free coast in each
country, we first compute the distance to the nearest ice-free coast for every
point in the country in equirectangular projection with standard parallels at
30 degrees, on the basis of sea and sea ice area features contained in the
fifth edition of the Digital Chart of the World (U.S. National Imagery and
Mapping Agency, 2000) and the country boundaries described above. We
then average this distance across all land in each country not covered by
inland water features. Units are thousands of kilometers.
European Colonial Origin Indicators
European colonial origin indicators are based on Teorell and Hadenius
(2007). They distinguish British, French, Portuguese, Spanish, and other
European (Dutch, Belgian, and Italian) colonial origin for countries col-
onized since 1700. For countries under several colonial powers, the last
one is counted provided that it lasted for ten years or longer. Since Teo-
rell and Hadenius exclude the British settler colonies (the United States,
Canada, Australia, Israel, and New Zealand), we code these as having
a British colonial origin. We complete their data using the same rule
to determine the European colonial origin of French Polynesia (French),
Hong Kong (British), Macau (Portuguese), New Caledonia (French), Nauru
(British), Philippines (Spanish), Puerto Rico (Spanish), and Papua New
Guinea (British).
Legal Origin Indicators
Legal origin indicators (common law, French civil law, German civil
law, Scandinavian law, and Socialist law) are from La Porta et al. (1999).
Some of our regressions include French Polynesia, absent from their data,
which we have coded as French civil law.
African Region Indicators
Region indicators for sub-Saharan Africa (East Africa, Central Africa,
West Africa, and South Africa) are from Bratton and van de Walle (1997).
We assign African countries North of the Saharan desert, which were not
classified by Bratton and van de Walle, to the region of North Africa.
Slave Exports
Estimates of the number of slaves exported between 1400 and 1900 in
Africa’s four slave trades are from Nunn (2008). The data are constructed
by combining shipping data with data from various historic documents
reporting the ethnicities of slaves shipped from Africa. Combining the two
sources, Nunn is able to construct an estimate of the number of slaves
shipped from each country in Africa between 1400 and 1900 during Africa’s
four slave trades. We normalize the export figures by a country’s land sur-
face area, computed as explained above. Because some country’s have no
slave exports, we take the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of slaves
exported per thousand square kilometers. See Nunn (2008) for more infor-
mation on the nature of the data, including why it is appropriate to use the
natural logarithm of slave exports.
Quality of Governance
To measure the quality of governance in each country, we use the com-
posite variable rule of law from version VII of the World Bank’s Worldwide
Governance Indicators database (Kaufmann et al., 2008). It consists of
“perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement,
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime
and violence” (Kaufmann et al., 2008, p. 7).
Distance to Export Markets
Four variables measuring the distance from each country to the closest
final destination slave market in each of Africa’s four slave trades are taken
from Nunn (2008). For the transatlantic and Indian Ocean slave trades, the
measure is the sailing distance from the point on the coast that is closest
to the country’s centroid to the closest final export destination for slave
trade. For the trans-Saharan and Red Sea slave trades, the measure is the
great circle overland distance from the country’s centroid to the closest final
export destination for that slave trade. Units are thousands of kilometers.
Population Density in 1400
The data are constructed using historic population estimates from
McEvedy and Jones (1978). For countries grouped with others in McEvedy
and Jones, we allocate population to countries in the group according to the
distribution of population in 1950, obtained from United Nations (2007).
We normalize total population in 1400 by the land area of each country, cal-
culated as described above. Because the variable is extremely skewed to the
left and because the territory covered by some countries today had 0 pop-
ulation density in 1400, we take the natural logarithm of 1 plus population
density (measured in people per square kilometer).
